The development of selective copying : children's learning from an expert versus their mother by Lucas, Amanda J. et al.
Running head: CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   1 
 
The Development of Selective Copying:  
Children’s Learning from an Expert versus their Mother 
Amanda J. Lucas
1, 2
, Emily R. R. Burdett
1
, Vanessa Burgess
1
, Lara A. Wood
1
, Nicola 
McGuigan
3
, Paul L. Harris
4
 and Andrew Whiten
1
 
 
1
Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, School of Psychology & Neuroscience, 
University of St Andrews, KY16 9JP 
2
College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, TR10 9EZ 
3
School of Life Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, EH14 4AS 
4
Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, MA 02138 
 
 
 
 
E-mail: aw2@st-andrews.ac.uk (corresponding author) 
Author Note: We would like to thank the research assistants who helped us to carry out this 
study: Zaynab Berrada, Ruth Carlton, Sarah Dougan and Murillo Pagnotta. We also express 
our gratitude to the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland for supporting the experiments at 
Edinburgh Zoo, as well as to the parents and children who participated.  Finally, we give our 
thanks to Blackwell Community Primary School and Portreath Community Primary School, 
Cornwall, for taking part in the follow-up study. This work was supported by a John 
Templeton Foundation grant ID 40128. 
 
 
 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   2 
 
Abstract 
This study tested the prediction that, with age, children should rely less on familiarity and 
more on expertise in their selective social learning.  Experiment 1 (N=50) found that 5- to 6-
year-olds copied the technique their mother used to extract a prize from a novel puzzle box, 
in preference to both a stranger and an established expert.  This bias occurred despite children 
acknowledging the expert model’s superior capability.  Experiment 2 (N=50) demonstrated a 
shift in 7-to 8-year-olds towards copying the expert.  Children aged 9- to 10-years did not 
copy according to a model bias.  The findings of a follow-up study (N=30) confirmed that, 
instead, they prioritized their own – partially flawed – causal understanding of the puzzle 
box. 
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The Development of Selective Copying:  
Children’s Learning from an Expert versus their Mother 
A rich wave of research over the past decade into the development of selective social 
learning has found that young children display a range of cognitive biases disposing them 
towards learning new information from the most competent and culturally appropriate models 
in their social spheres (Harris, 2012; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013).  There is now a growing 
interest in evaluating this body of new work in relation to the broader topic of the evolution 
of culture (Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, 2015; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Henrich & 
Broesch, 2011; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, & Stringer, 2011).  The field of cultural evolution 
offers an explanatory framework for understanding both how human cognition evolved to 
facilitate the acquisition of complex culture, and the population-level consequences of 
selective learning biases that shape how culture is transmitted over successive generations.  
The newer developmental research is beginning to offer empirical evaluation of more 
longstanding theoretical models of cultural evolution.  For instance, experimental support has 
been provided for predictions that individuals should learn selectively from others according 
to such factors as model competence, age, prestige, consensus and familiarity (Chudek, 
Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Morgan, Laland, & Harris, 2015). 
Regarding the latter bias – familiarity – there is debate in the cultural evolution 
literature concerning the extent to which culture is predominately transferred ‘vertically’ 
from parents or ‘horizontally/obliquely’ from other non-family adults or peers (see Hewlett, 
Fouts, Boyette, & Hewlett, 2011; Mesoudi, 2009).  Early models of cultural transmission 
make different population level predictions based upon which mode of transmission is most 
influential.  Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) developed mathematical models indicating 
that vertical transmission leads to highly conserved pockets of culture, whilst oblique or 
horizontal transmission leads to the rapid spread of new practices and beliefs.  Subsequent 
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empirical evidence for the two types of proliferation is mixed.  Interview-based psychological 
and anthropological studies generally support the case for vertical transmission (e.g., Cavalli-
Sforza, Feldman, Chen, & Dornbusch, 1982; Hewlett & Cavalli-Sforza, 1986), as individuals 
tend retrospectively to say that they learned their skills, beliefs and habits predominantly 
from their parents.  However, modeling by McElreath and Strimling (2008) concluded that 
vertical transmission is adaptive only in times of environmental stability (i.e., when behaviors 
do not need to adapt to changing circumstances), and more recent observational and 
experimental approaches in small scale societies find some evidence in favor of oblique and 
horizontal transmission (Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Hewlett et al., 2011).   
In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting lines of evidence, Henrich and Broesch 
(2011) postulate a two-stage theory of transmission.  They hypothesize that children should 
initially learn from their parents.  At this stage of life they possess low skill levels that do not 
require the input of specialist expertise.  Parents are therefore the most appropriate models, 
since they are ‘low-cost’ (to the child) and willing to invest large amounts of time in teaching 
and scaffolding a range of fundamental skills.  As children get older they are more likely to 
benefit from honing these basic skills by learning preferentially from non-family members 
according to model biases – for example, favoring those who are deemed to be particularly 
competent or prestigious.  This two-stage theory may explain the discrepancy between 
interview-based findings (favoring vertical transmission) and experimental findings (favoring 
oblique and horizontal transmission), as individuals might initially learn a particular skill 
from their parents, but later refine their proficiency by observing experts in the community.  
If they learned 80% of a skill (e.g., how to use a bow and arrow) from their parents and 20% 
from an expert, they are perhaps likely to say, when interviewed, that they learned the skill 
from their parents – overlooking the role of experts in their learning (Henrich & Broesch, 
2011). 
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Evidence from experimental studies of children’s learning from testimony offers 
strong support for an initial vertical learning preference in young children.  Given a forced 
choice, preschoolers endorse new information provided by their familiar caregivers (i.e. their 
mothers or preschool teachers) above that provided by strangers (Corriveau et al., 2009; 
Corriveau & Harris, 2009).  Tellingly, however, this preference seems to shift in importance 
throughout development.  If children witness their familiar teacher provide inaccurate 
information (e.g., incorrectly labeling familiar objects) whilst an unfamiliar teacher provides 
accurate information (e.g., correctly labeling familiar objects) they respond differently 
according to their age.  Three-year-olds ignore their teacher’s previous inaccuracy and 
continue to endorse her testimony when learning the name of a novel object.  Five-year-olds, 
in contrast, place their trust in the previously accurate stranger (Corriveau & Harris, 2009). 
This age-related change suggests that children move beyond an initial socio-emotional pull to 
trust familiar caregivers and begin to place more value on indicators of competence that may 
help them to distinguish reliable sources of information amongst non-family members (Harris 
& Corriveau, 2011).  Indeed, Corriveau et al. (2009) also found that an initial preference, in 
5-year-olds, for learning words from their mother rather than a stranger was reversed (in 
securely attached children at least) if their mother provided an improbable answer.   
The findings of Corriveau, Harris and colleagues lend initial support to Henrich and 
Broesch's (2011) two-stage theory, as they suggest that children’s preference for learning 
from their familiar caregivers becomes more discriminating with age.  This work provides 
interesting insights into how young children respond to the inaccuracies of their familiar 
caregivers.  However it does not tell us about the weighting that children place on familiarity 
versus expertise per se.  This was the focus of the present study. We examined children’s 
preference for learning from their mother versus an expert, when their mother was not 
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explicitly shown to be wrong.  Thus, rather than emphasizing to children the inaccuracy of 
their caregiver, we instead emphasized the expertise of the stranger.   
In this sense, the present experiment echoes, to some extent, those in which infants 
have been shown to be sensitive to the expertise of an experimenter in laboratory settings.  
These studies are consistent in demonstrating that infants are more likely to visually reference 
an experimenter than their mother when presented with an ambiguous toy (Kim & Kwak, 
2011; Walden & Kim, 2005 – for review see Harris & Lane, 2014).  They also proceed to 
play with such a toy for longer if an experimenter encourages them to do so, than if their 
mother does the same (Stenberg, 2009).  Such findings hint at a precocious understanding in 
infants that an experimenter is the local ‘expert’ in unfamiliar settings (Harris & Lane, 2014).  
Whether or not this anticipates young children’s actual copying of the actions or skills of an 
expert, rather than their mother, is a question addressed in the current study.   
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we tested whom children would preferentially copy - their mother or 
a stranger - when trying to extract a prize from a puzzle box.  There were two between-
subject conditions: Mother vs. Stranger and Mother vs. Expert.  The Mother vs. Stranger 
condition was designed to provide a baseline level of children’s preference for copying their 
mother.  Comparing this to the Mother vs. Expert condition would then enable evaluation of 
the relative weighting that children place on expertise.  The chosen age range of the 
participants was 5- to 6-years, as this is the age at which existing studies (Corriveau & Harris, 
2009; Corriveau et al., 2009) find children become more discerning in their selective learning 
from their caregivers’ testimony.  In line with Corriveau et al., we predicted that children 
would prefer to learn from their mother in the Mother vs. Stranger condition.  Of interest was 
whether this preference would shift in the Mother vs. Expert condition.   
Model Biases for Learning Actions: Considerations and a Further Prediction  
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The vast majority of selective social learning experiments have been conducted in the 
domain of word learning, whereby one informant provides one novel label, and another 
informant provides an alternative novel label, for an unfamiliar object.  In these 
circumstances children cannot possibly work out the answer for themselves, as object labels 
are arbitrary and socially constructed.  Very few equivalent studies have been conducted in 
the domain of imitation and the copying of causal actions.  In such experiments, children 
observe different models performing alternative actions to achieve the same goal (Hu, 
Buchsbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2013; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015).  These studies are 
fundamentally different from those that test word-learning, in that it is possible for children to 
integrate their own causal understanding with the information they gain socially, in order to 
achieve the end goal (see Hu et al., 2013, for a discussion).  Indeed, both Hu et al. (2013) and 
Wood et al. (2015) demonstrate that model biases are reduced (or lost altogether) when 
children are provided with more causal information about the task.   
The present study sought to elicit a high reliance on social learning from one model or 
the other (and a low reliance on personal learning) by employing a causally opaque puzzle 
box task.  Children could not see into the puzzle box, so they could not observe the causal 
mechanisms connecting the two alternative actions (demonstrated by the models) to the 
releasing of the prize.  To gauge the strength of children’s reliance on social learning, we also 
measured how many times children implemented their chosen action on the puzzle box. Both 
models – mother and stranger/expert – performed their particular action twice in succession 
(i.e., more times than was actually necessary to release the prize).  If children are faithful in 
their copying of these two complete actions, then this will indicate strong social learning.  If, 
however, they copy less than twice, then this might indicate a more personal stance – 
whereby children integrate their causal understanding that repeating the action is not 
necessary to release the prize.  Because (a) the causal relations between the actions and the 
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outcome in the current task were deliberately opaque and (b) children have been shown to 
‘overimitate’ even obviously causally inefficient actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, 
Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011), we predicted that children in the present experiment 
would show strong social learning and copy their chosen action twice.    
Method 
Participants 
Fifty 5- to 6-year-olds and their mothers were recruited whilst visiting Edinburgh 
Zoo, Scotland.  Twenty-five were assigned to the Mother vs. Stranger condition (9 female; 
age range 60-83 months; mean 72.6) and twenty-five to the Mother vs. Expert condition (14 
female; age range 60-83 months; mean 70.48).  The participants were 98% British and 
predominantly ethnically White.  All children spoke English as a first language.  Note that the 
decision to restrict participant selection to mothers (rather than fathers or grandparents who 
also accompany children to Edinburgh Zoo) was in order to make the current findings 
comparable with previous research that has focused on mothers (though Henrich and 
Broesch’s (2011) prediction would suggest a similar pattern of results for any closely related 
caregiver). 
Materials 
A children’s table and two chairs were set up in front of a 23-inch monitor that was 
connected to a laptop.  The screen was used to display: (a) A simple children’s video game 
that was operated using a mouse.  The game had background music that children listened to 
using headphones.  This served as a distraction while the child’s mother was being trained in 
how to operate the test puzzle box; (b) Short video clips of two models attempting to obtain 
prizes from three different puzzle boxes (see Table 1 and Supplementary Electronic 
Materials).  The purpose of these clips was to establish the expertise of ‘Jenny’ (an 
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experimenter).  Jenny was successful at obtaining prizes from all three puzzle boxes.  In 
contrast, another unknown female model was unsuccessful. 
Two puzzle boxes – a ‘practice’ puzzle box and a ‘test’ puzzle box – were employed.  
The practice puzzle box can be seen in Figure 1a.  A reward (a hollow egg containing a 
sticker) was pushed into the box through a tube on the side and there were two alternative 
methods that could be attempted to release it. One method – the ‘Handle’ – was non-
functional.  The other method – the ‘Flap’ – was functional in ejecting the prize.  When the 
reward was released it landed in an opaque, red, prize receptacle.  Children needed to open 
the lid of this receptacle in order to discover whether or not they had been successful.  The 
test puzzle box (adapted from Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015) can be seen in Figure 1b.  A 
reward was dropped into the box through a pipe on the top and there were two alternative 
methods that could be attempted to release it.  Both of these methods – the ‘Slide’ and the 
‘Trapdoor’ – were functional in ejecting the prize.  As with the practice box, when the reward 
was released it landed in an opaque, red, prize receptacle.  In this case, the receptacle was 
secured with a padlock that needed to be opened by the experimenter before children could 
discover whether or not they had been successful. (See Supplementary Electronic Materials 
for a video showing the operation of the test puzzle box.) 
Procedure 
The testing took place in a gazebo erected in the Budongo Visitors’ Centre of 
Edinburgh Zoo.  The Mother vs. Stranger procedure is first described below, followed by an 
explanation of how this differed in the Mother vs. Expert condition. 
Mother vs. Stranger condition. 
Distraction task and training of mother.  Each child was invited to take part in a 
distraction task with Experimenter 1 (E1).  The task was a moderately noisy video game, for 
which the child was required to wear headphones.  While the child was distracted, his or her 
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mother was trained out of sight by E2 in how to perform one of the two alternative actions on 
the puzzle box (either the Slide or the Trapdoor).  This training involved both learning what 
to say (‘Oh, I’ve seen one of these before.  I think you do this to get the prize out’) and the 
action, which was to be repeated twice.  Thus, for the Slide, the mother was taught to slide a 
handle back and forth two times.  For the Trapdoor, she was taught to pull a lever in and out 
two times.  ‘Jenny’ (an experimenter who acted either as the stranger or the expert) was 
present for this training.  She and the mother took turns in practicing the method that they had 
been assigned and delivering their utterance.  This gave the mother the opportunity to match 
Jenny (as far as possible) in intonation and confidence. 
Practice puzzle box.  The practice box served two purposes.  First, it illustrated to the 
child that the reward needed to be moved from the main puzzle box into the red prize 
receptacle.  Second, it demonstrated that only one of the two attempted actions was the 
correct one for releasing the prize.  It was hoped that this would signal that it was possible to 
perform an incorrect action and not win the prize.  This, in turn, might place implicit pressure 
on the child to choose the ‘correct’ action when operating the subsequent test puzzle box.    
E1 brought the distraction task to a close and explained to the child that it was now 
time to look at some puzzle boxes.  E2 entered the test area and brought out the training box 
saying, ‘Here is the first puzzle box.  It’s quite funny looking isn’t it?  This is what we do 
with it.’  She then showed the child a plastic egg that contained a sticker. ‘I have a special 
egg with a sticker inside.  To win the sticker the egg goes inside and you need to get it out of 
the puzzle box (points to the main body of the puzzle box) and into the red box (points to the 
red prize receptacle).  Now there is only one way that works.  Why don’t you try this way 
first (points to Handle)?  Pull it out.  Okay, now have a look in the red box and see if you got 
the egg? No?  Well that way doesn’t work.  Let’s try a different way.  Try moving this flap 
here (motions to the Flap).  Okay, now have a look in the red box and see if you got the egg. 
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Yes! Well done! You have won a sticker!’ E2 removed the sticker from the egg and gave it to 
the child.   
Test puzzle box.  E2 brought out the test puzzle box and said, ‘It’s another funny 
looking one isn’t it?  Our boss only gave us this puzzle box today.  We know the egg goes in 
the top here.  But we don’t know how to get it out, do we?’ E2 then looked to E1, who shook 
her head and put her hands up in confusion.  E2 continued, ‘And this time you only get one 
turn at trying to win the sticker. Mmmm…I wonder if somebody could show us what to do?’  
E2 then asked E1 if she would go out into the zoo and look for someone who might be able to 
show them how to get the prize out.  E1 agreed and exited the testing area for approximately 
10 seconds.  She returned with Jenny (who was wearing a coat and carrying a bag) saying, 
‘I’ve found someone who says they would like to look at the puzzle box.  This is Jenny.  She 
is here visiting the zoo today’.  E2 replied, ‘Hello Jenny.  Nice to meet you.  We are trying to 
learn how to get a prize out of this puzzle box’.  Jenny then demonstrated one of the two 
actions on the puzzle box while saying, ‘Oh, I have seen one of these before.  I think you do 
this to get the prize out.’  As Jenny was shown out of the test area E1 said, ‘There is also 
another person who says they will look at the puzzle box.  I will just go and get them’.  She 
soon returned with the child’s mother saying, ‘Here is the other person who says they will 
take a look at the puzzle box.  It is [child’s name’s] mum’.   E2 said, ‘Hello [child’s name’s] 
mum.  We are trying to learn how to get a prize out of this puzzle box’.  The mother 
demonstrated the other of the two actions on the puzzle box whilst delivering the same 
utterance as Jenny (i.e., ‘Oh, I have seen one of these before.  I think you do this to get the 
prize out’).  She was then shown out of the test area.  The order in which Jenny and the 
Mother were brought into the testing area was counterbalanced.  In addition, the actions 
assigned to the Mother and Jenny (Slide or Trapdoor) and the order in which these actions 
were presented (Slide first or Trapdoor first) were also counterbalanced. 
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In the final testing stage, E2 placed an egg (with a sticker inside) into the puzzle box 
and invited the child to try and get it out.  When the child had finished manipulating the 
puzzle box, E2 noted which action he or she performed and the number of times it was 
completed, before asking two questions.  The first was to ascertain the child’s reason for 
choosing the method he or she used; the second was intended to assess the child’s 
understanding of which model was more proficient.  Thus E2 said, ‘Just before we open the 
red box to find out if you got the egg, can you tell me why you chose to do it this way 
(motioning to the action that the child had used)?’   After the child had given their answer, E2 
said, ‘And who do you thinking is better at getting prizes out of puzzle boxes?  Is it Jenny – 
the lady that was just here – or your Mum?’ (The order of mention of Jenny and the Mother 
was counterbalanced). 
The experiment was brought to a close by E2 unlocking the red prize receptacle and 
allowing the child to retrieve the egg with the sticker inside it.  Children who had not copied 
their mother’s method were invited to try the puzzle box again using her method (with an 
empty egg) to demonstrate that both methods actually worked.  The purpose of this was to 
ensure that children did not leave the experiment believing that their mother had shown them 
something that was ‘wrong’. 
Mother vs. Expert condition.  The procedure for the Mother vs. Expert condition 
was the same as for the Mother vs. Stranger condition except that there was an extra stage in 
which children were familiarized to the expertise of Jenny.  This occurred after the distraction 
task and before children were introduced to the puzzle boxes.  Children were introduced to 
Jenny and told that she was ‘very good at getting prizes out of puzzle boxes’.  They then 
viewed three short videos in which Jenny successfully retrieved prizes out of three different 
puzzle boxes.  This was in comparison to another unknown person in a yellow shirt, who was 
not successful.  The purpose of including the unsuccessful person was to emphasize Jenny’s 
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expertise.   After the child had viewed both Jenny’s and the unknown person’s attempt on a 
particular puzzle box, he or she was asked, ‘Who got the prize out of the puzzle box?  Was it 
Jenny or the lady in yellow?  (The order of mention of Jenny and the lady in yellow was 
counterbalanced; all children answered these questions correctly). When all three videos had 
been viewed, E2 said, ‘So you can see that Jenny really is good at getting prizes out of puzzle 
boxes.’  At this point in the procedure Jenny’s mobile phone rang and she excused herself to 
take the call.  The experiment then proceeded in exactly the same way as the Mother vs. 
Stranger condition, except for two small changes.  The first was that Jenny was not wearing a 
coat or carrying a bag.  This was because, in this condition, she was not intended to look like 
a visitor to the zoo.  The second was the wording that E1 used when she re-introduced Jenny.  
Instead of saying that Jenny was ‘visiting the zoo’ she simply said, ‘I found Jenny outside.  
She would like to look at the puzzle box’. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis revealed no significant differences in children’s responses 
according to Age, Gender, Method (i.e., whether the Mother demonstrated the Slide or the 
Trapdoor method) or Model Order (i.e. whether the Mother performed her demonstration 
before or after Jenny).  These factors are not therefore included in the subsequent analyses, 
which are presented in four sections.  The first examines which model (mother or Jenny) 
children copied.  The second describes children’s response to the forced-choice question, 
‘Who do you think is better at getting prizes out of puzzle boxes?  Is it your Mum, or is it 
Jenny?’  The third reports how many times children completed their chosen action on the 
puzzle box.  The fourth section explores children’s responses to the question, ‘Why did you 
choose this way to get the prize out of the puzzle box?’   
A small number of children (Mother vs. Stranger condition = 2; Mother vs. Expert 
condition = 1) attempted to reproduce both methods on the puzzle box (i.e., both the Slide 
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and the Trapdoor).  These three children are not included in the subsequent analyses because 
it was not possible (a) to ascertain whether they copied their mother or Jenny; (b) to record 
how many times they completed their chosen action, because they did not choose one single 
action; and (c) to ascertain why they completed their chosen action, as they did not choose 
one single action. 
Whom Did Children Copy? 
In the Mother vs. Stranger condition, 19 children copied their mother and 5 copied 
Jenny (Binomial, p <.01).  In the Mother vs. Expert condition, 17 children copied their 
mother and 6 copied Jenny (Binomial, p <.03).  Thus, the number of children who copied 
their mother was significantly higher than the number expected by chance in both conditions.  
There was no significant difference in the proportion of children who copied their mother 
between the two conditions (p = .74, two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test).   
Whom Did Children Say Were ‘Better’? 
Children’s responses to the forced-choice question, ‘Who is better at getting prizes 
out of puzzle boxes?  Is it your Mum or Jenny?’ were split into three categories: Mother, 
Jenny and Other.  The category of ‘Other’ included children who: (a) did not answer, (b) 
shrugged their shoulders, or (c) gave an alternative reply (such as saying that they themselves 
were better at getting prizes out of puzzle boxes). (Note that children who made an Other 
response were not further encouraged to make a selection, as it was possible that their reserve 
was due to them not wanting to explicitly say that someone other than their mother was 
‘better’.)  In the Mother vs. Stranger condition, 16 children said their mother was ‘better’, 4 
said Jenny was ‘better’ and 4 gave a response that was categorized as Other.  In the Mother 
vs. Expert condition 3 children said their mother was ‘better’, 12 said Jenny was ‘better’ and 
8 gave an Other response. A Chi square test of independence revealed a significant difference 
in response between the two conditions, whereby fewer children said that their mother was 
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better in the Mother vs. Expert condition than in the Mother vs. Stranger condition: X
2
(2, N = 
47) = 14.21, p < .001.  
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of children who copied their mother and the 
percentage who said she was ‘better’ in each of the two conditions.  In order to examine 
whether individual children changed their responses between the two types of trial, they were 
categorized as follows: In the Mother vs. Stranger condition, 14 children both copied their 
mother and said she was ‘better’; 5 copied their mother, but did not say she was ‘better’; 2 
did not copy their mother, but said she was ‘better’ and 3 did not copy their mother and did 
not say she was ‘better’.  A McNemar test was non-significant (x2 (1, N = 24) = 0.57, p = 
.45), indicating that children tended to make the same response for whom they copied and 
whom they said was ‘better’.  In the Mother vs. Expert condition, 2 children both copied their 
mother and said she was ‘better’; 15 copied their mother, but did not say she was ‘better’; 1 
did not copy his mother, but said she was ‘better’ and 5 did not copy their mother and did not 
say she was ‘better’.  A McNemar test revealed a significant shift in response between the 
two types of trial (x
2
 (1, N = 23) = 10.56, p = .001), indicating that children who copied their 
mother tended not to say that she was ‘better’.  
How Many Completions Did Children Make? 
For the Slide action, one full completion was defined as the handle being moved 
along the length of the puzzle box towards the child and then back again to its original 
position.  For the Trapdoor action, one full completion was defined as the lever being pulled 
out and then pushed back in again.  If children did not make a full completion – for example, 
if they moved the handle only towards themselves and not back again (for the Slide), or if 
they pulled out the lever, but did not push it back (for the Trapdoor) this was counted as half.  
The mean number of full completions made by children was 2.18 (SD 0.43) and 1.99 (SD 
0.41) in the Mother vs. Stranger and Mother vs. Expert conditions respectively, and 2.11 (SD 
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0.29) and 2.01 (SD 1.01), according to whether they copied their mother or Jenny.  A two-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with Number of Completions as the 
dependent variable.  The between-participant factors were Condition (Mother vs. Stranger, 
Mother vs. Expert) and Who Was Copied (Mother, Jenny).  This analysis revealed no reliable 
main effect and no significant interaction (F(3, 43) = 0.04, p = .99).  Children witnessed two 
full completions of each demonstrated action and the overall mean number that they 
reproduced was 2.10 (SD 1.66). Thus, children were, on average – across conditions and 
regardless of which model they copied – faithful in terms of the number of times they copied. 
Why Did Children Say they performed their Chosen Action? 
Children’s responses to the question probing why they chose the action that they 
performed were coded into five categories: Model, Causal, Better, Uninformative and Don’t 
Know.  The category of ‘Model’ was used when children said that they had chosen their 
action because they had copied one of the models (either their mother or Jenny).  Example 
responses included, ‘Cos my mum showed me’, ‘Because I like my mum’s idea more’ and 
‘We were watching Jenny (i.e., opening puzzle boxes on video)’.  Explanations were coded 
as ‘Causal’ when children provided a physical reason explaining why their chosen method 
would release the prize.  Examples included, ‘It might push harder than the other one’, ‘Cos 
the egg will slide along and go into the red box’ and ‘Because you have to pull to make it go 
down’.  The category of ‘Better’ was used when children described their preferred method as 
somehow easier to perform or better than the other without saying why: ‘It would be easier’, 
‘A good way I thought’.  Responses were coded as ‘Uninformative’ if they did not provide 
any information about a particular method.  For instance, ‘To get it into the red box’, ‘Cos I 
did’, and ‘It might get it’.   Finally, children who either said nothing or said that they didn’t 
know why they chose their particular action were coded as ‘Don’t Know’.  The number of 
children providing responses in each of these five categories can be seen in Table 2.  
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Collapsing across the two conditions, only a relatively small number of children (23%) 
explicitly said that they copied a model.  The most common response (34% of children) was 
Causal.  Indeed, over half of those children who provided an informative response 
(disregarding those in the Don’t Know and Uninformative categories) generated a causal 
explanation for why their chosen method was effective.  
Discussion 
We examined 5- to 6-year-olds’ preferential copying of their mother versus a 
previously unknown female adult, when trying to learn how to release a prize from a puzzle 
box.  In the Mother vs. Stranger condition, children received no history regarding the 
unknown female’s proficiency at opening puzzle boxes.  In the Mother vs. Expert condition, 
children were told that the previously unknown female was ‘very good at getting prizes out of 
puzzle boxes’ and were shown video evidence confirming that this was the case.  As 
predicted, in the former condition, it was found that children displayed a strong preference for 
copying the method demonstrated to them by their mother.  This result concurs with 
Corriveau et al. (2009), suggesting that children’s preference for learning from their mother 
generalizes from the domain of language acquisition to the domain of copying skills and 
actions.  It also provides further verification of Henrich and Broesch's (2011) prediction of an 
initial vertical learning bias in young children.  
Of interest was whether this bias for learning from their mother would shift when 
children were given information about a stranger’s expertise.  Such a switch, however, did 
not occur.  Children copied their mother’s method of opening the puzzle box, despite being 
provided with evidence of the unknown female adult’s prowess.  They did this at exactly the 
same rate as in the Mother vs. Stranger condition, suggesting that expertise has no impact on 
5- to 6-year-old children’s preferential copying of their mother.  This finding stands in 
contrast to the discrimination that 5-year-olds seemed to show when learning words from 
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their familiar caregivers (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & Harris, 2009).  Unlike those 
studies, the mothers in the current experiment did not provide any incorrect information (or 
demonstrate incompetence). This may suggest that children of this age are mistrustful of 
learning from their mothers only when their mothers are explicitly shown to be wrong.  
A possible explanation for children’s seeming lack of sensitivity to expertise in the 
present experiment is that they failed to generalize the proficiency that the expert model 
demonstrated in the video clips as relevant to the operation of the real-life puzzle box.  
However, a recent experiment suggests that children do indeed make this generalization.  
Burdett et al., (2015) employed the same type of video clips as in the present study – whereby 
one unknown female was successful, and another was unsuccessful, at retrieving prizes from 
a selection of puzzle boxes.  In test trials utilizing the same test puzzle box as the current 
experiment, children preferred to copy the previously successful model as compared to the 
model who was unsuccessful.  This finding would strongly suggest that difficulty in 
extrapolating expertise was not the cause of children’s failure to copy the expert in the 
present experiment.  
Moreover, children’s responses to the question, ‘Who was better at getting prizes out 
of puzzle boxes?’ confirms their comprehension of the successful model’s expertise.  Despite 
demonstrating a strong bias for copying their mother, children did not tend to go on to say 
that she was ‘better’.  Instead they either said that Jenny was better or they did not indicate 
either model.  In contrast, children who copied their mother in the Mother vs. Stranger 
condition tended to also say that she was better at getting prizes out of puzzle boxes.  The 
former result suggests a gap between what children understand about relative expertise and 
their actual behavior.  Such disparities are not uncommon in developmental experiments.  For 
instance, Robinson and Whitcombe (2003) found that preschoolers perform well in a 
procedural test of source monitoring skills, despite performing poorly on an equivalent 
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explicit measure.  It is usually the case, however, that children display an implicit 
understanding before they possess the corresponding explicit, or verbally expressed, 
comprehension. The present result appears to reveal the opposite effect. Children demonstrate 
an explicit understanding that their mother is not the most qualified model, yet their behavior 
implies that they nevertheless regard her to be the best person to copy.  This inconsistency 
may be an indication that a cognitive understanding of expertise is not the only driver of 
children’s selective copying.  Indeed, Corriveau et al. (2009) found that preschoolers’ 
preferential learning from their mother varies with their attachment style. Thus, it may be that 
children’s socio-emotional motivation to copy their mother trumps their intellectual 
understanding that she is not always the most competent.   
A further example of a discrepancy between children’s explicit understanding (as 
indexed by what they say) and implicit comprehension (as indexed by their behavior) is 
illustrated in their replies to why they chose their particular action.  Only a minority 
demonstrated explicit awareness that their behavior was motivated by a model bias.  Yet the 
strong preference that the group displayed for copying their mother clearly demonstrates its 
influence.  Overall the most common response was for children to generate a causal 
explanation for why their chosen action was preferred.  This finding might suggest that 
children were not consciously aware of the social learning strategy underlying their choice of 
method and that – on a post-hoc basis – they generated a physical reason for it.  This fits with 
the adult literature demonstrating that individuals are poor at introspecting on their cognitive 
processes and instead confabulate, constructing plausible causal justifications for why they 
make particular decisions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Indeed, the finding that children were, 
on average, faithful in copying two completions of their chosen action is further evidence that 
they adopted a social, rather than a causal, approach.  Recall that it was not necessary to make 
two full completions to release the prize. Thus, if children had truly chosen their particular 
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method because they had reasoned about how it might physically work, then it might be 
expected that they would copy their chosen action less than twice.    
Overall, Experiment 1 found that children aged 5- to 6-years demonstrate a strong 
bias towards copying their mothers, despite being explicitly aware of a stranger’s superior 
expertise.  It seems likely that such a bias is socio-emotionally motivated.   Presumably, if 
Henrich and Broesch (2011) are correct, children’s explicit reasoning about expertise should, 
with development, outweigh the sway of attachment.  Experiment 2 aimed to explore whether 
such a switch – from copying Mother to copying Expert – might take place, with age.   
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to explore the effect of age on children’s copying 
preferences when presented with their mother versus an expert. Thus the present experiment 
repeated the Mother vs. Expert condition of Experiment 1, with children aged 7- to 10-years. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five 7- to 8-year-olds (10 female; age range 84-107 months; mean 96.25) and 
twenty-five 9- to 10-year-olds (16 female; age range 108-131 months; mean 119.65) and their 
mothers were recruited whilst visiting Edinburgh Zoo, Scotland.  The participants were 96% 
British and predominantly ethnically White. All children spoke English as a first language. 
Materials and Procedure  
 The experimental materials and protocol were exactly the same as for the Mother vs. 
Expert condition of Experiment 1.   
Results 
Preliminary analysis revealed no significant differences in children’s responses 
according to Gender or Model Order.  These factors are not therefore included in the 
subsequent analyses, which are presented in the same format as Experiment 1.  There was, 
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however, an effect of Method, whereby children in the oldest age group demonstrated an 
overwhelming bias towards the Slide (as compared to the Trapdoor).  This effect will be 
presented and further examined in the final sections of the analyses.  
In order to test for effects of age throughout, the results of Experiment 1 (twenty-five 
5-to 6-year-olds, Mother vs. Expert condition) and Experiment 2 (twenty-five 7-to 8-year-
olds and twenty-five 9- to 10-year-olds) were combined, resulting in a sample size of 
seventy-five.  Eight children (two 5- to 6-year-olds, three 7- to 8-year-olds, three 9- to 10-
year-olds) who attempted to copy both methods on the puzzle box (i.e., both the Slide and the 
Trapdoor) are not included in the analyses for the reasons set out in Experiment 1. 
Whom Did Children Copy? 
A Chi square test of independence revealed a significant difference in the proportion 
of children copying their mother across the three age groups: X
2
(2, N = 67) = 6.42, p = .04 
(see Figure 3).  Further analysis revealed that this was driven by a difference between 5- to 6-
years (copy mother: copy expert; 17:6) and 7- to 8-years (copy mother: copy expert; 8:14), 
indicating a switch away from copying the mother and towards copying the expert (p = .02, 
Fisher’s Exact test).  However, the number of children copying the expert did not differ from 
chance for either the 7- to 8-year-olds (copy mother: copy expert; 8:14, Binomial, p = .29) or 
the 9- to 10-year-olds (copy mother: copy expert; 12:10, Binomial, p = .83).   
Whom Did Children Say Were ‘Better’? 
Children’s responses to the forced-choice question, ‘Who is better at getting prizes 
out of puzzle boxes?  Is it your Mum or Jenny?’ were split into three categories: Mother, 
Expert and Other.  Of the 5- to 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, Mother vs. Expert condition) 3 
children said their mother was ‘better’, 12 said the Expert was ‘better’ and 8 gave an Other 
response.  Of the 7- to 8-year-olds, none said their mother was ‘better’, 12 said the Expert 
was ‘better’ and 10 made a response categorized as Other. Of the 9- to 10-year-olds, 3 
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children said their mother was ‘better’, 15 said the Expert was ‘better’ and 4 made an Other 
response.  A Chi Square test of independence confirmed that there was no significant 
difference in response across the age groups: X
2
(4, N = 67) = 6.04, p = .20, demonstrating 
that similarly few children, of all ages, said that their mother was ‘better’.   
How Many Completions Did Children Make? 
The mean number of full completions (with standard deviations) made by children in 
each age group were: 5- to 6-years (Experiment 1, Mother vs. Expert condition) = 2.02 
(1.56), 7- to 8-years = 1.91 (1.48), 9- to 10-years = 1.05 (.53).   A one-way ANOVA 
conducted with Number of Completions as the dependent measure and Age (5- to 6-years, 7- 
to 8-years, 9- to 10-years) as the between-participant factor revealed a reliable difference 
among the age groups, F(2, 64) = 3.87, p = .03, η2 = .11.  Post hoc (Tukey-Kramer) 
comparisons revealed that the 9- to 10-year-olds made fewer completions than the 5- to 6-
year-olds.  The number of completions made by the 7- to 8-year-olds did not differ from the 
5- to 6-year-olds, but approached significance in differing from the 9- to 10-year-olds.  Figure 
4 depicts the means for the three age groups with 95% confidence intervals.   
Why Did Children Say they Performed their Chosen Action? 
The number of children providing responses in each of the five categories (Model, 
Causal, Better, Uninformative and Don’t Know) can be seen in Table 2.  Consistent with the 
results from the 5- to 6-year-olds, only a relatively small number of children aged 7- to 10-
years said that they copied a model.  Again, the most common response was Causal.  It was 
not possible to conduct meaningful non-parametric analyses examining age differences on 
these data (because expected frequencies for some categories were less than 5).  However, 
arithmetically, the tendency to provide a causal explanation increased with age.  At age 5- to 
6-years (Experiment1, Mother vs. Expert condition) 26% of responses were Causal, whereas 
the figure was 50% for 7- to 8-year-olds, and 68% for 9- to 10-year-olds.   
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Were the Slide and the Trapdoor Chosen Equally Often? 
Because the model – mother or expert – performing either the Slide or the Trapdoor 
was counterbalanced, it should be expected (if there was no prior preference for either the 
Slide or the Trapdoor), that an equal number of children should select one or the other of 
these two actions.  Of the 5- to 6-year-olds (Experiment 1, Mother vs. Expert condition), 14 
used the Slide and 9 used the Trapdoor (Binomial, p = .40). Of the 7- to 8-year-olds, 15 used 
the Slide and 7 used the Trapdoor (Binomial, p = .13).  However among the 9- to 10-year-
olds, 22 used the Slide and none used the Trapdoor (Binomial, p < .001).  Thus, the Slide was 
used more often than would be expected by chance by the 9- to 10-year-olds only. A Chi 
Square test of independence revealed a significant difference in the proportion of children 
using the Slide across the three age groups: X
2
(2, N = 67) = 10.61, p < .001 (see Figure 3).  
Further analysis confirmed that this was driven by a difference between 7- to 8-years and 9- 
to 10-years (p < .01, two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test).   
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Although the proportion of 7- to 8-year-olds using the Slide versus the Trapdoor did 
not represent a statistically significant preference, the ratio of 15:7 was nevertheless not 
entirely convincing of a chance distribution.  This might suggest that a bias for the Slide 
method, detected in the 9- to 10-year-olds, gradually emerged with age.   To investigate this 
possibility we examined children of 7- versus 8-years separately and found that for 7-year-
olds, 7 used the Slide and 5 used the Trapdoor (Binomial, p = .77), whereas for 8-year-olds 
the proportion was 8:2 (Binomial, p = .11).   Interestingly, if we also look at the number of 
children who copied their mother versus the expert separately for 7- and 8 year-olds, we find 
that the ratio is 2:10 (copy mother: copy expert) for 7-year-olds (Binomial, p = .04) and 6:4 
for 8-year-olds (Binomial, p = .75).  Thus, 7-year-olds are at chance in their use of the Slide 
versus the Trapdoor, and copy the expert more often than would be expected by chance. 
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Eight-year-olds, in contrast, approach significance in their use of the Slide versus the 
Trapdoor and perform at chance in their copying of their mother versus the expert. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to discover the age at which children might switch from 
copying their mother to copying a previously unknown female with demonstrable expertise.  
We found that 7- to 8-year-old children copied their mothers significantly less than 5- to 6-
year-olds.   However, this apparent developmental switch towards the expert was not realized 
in the oldest children.  Nine- to ten-year-olds performed at chance in copying their mother 
versus the expert.  Moreover, almost without exception, they favored use of the Slide (over 
the Trapdoor) for releasing the prize from the puzzle box.  Like the younger children, nearly 
all of them acknowledged that their mother was not the best qualified model.  Thus, it would 
seem that older children’s understanding of expertise was outweighed by their ‘Slide bias’. 
This finding of a Slide bias in the oldest children renders the result from the 7- to 8-
year-olds difficult to interpret.  Did they copy their mother less than the 5- to 6-year-olds 
because they valued expertise more heavily, or because they showed the beginnings of the 
Slide bias?  Two pieces of evidence suggest that children in this age group (the youngest 
members at least) did genuinely switch towards the expert.  The first comes from post-hoc 
analysis examining 7- and 8-year-olds separately.  The former showed no evidence of 
favoring the Slide and they copied the expert model above chance.  Indeed, 83% of 7-year-
olds copied the expert.  In contrast, 8-year-olds performed at chance in their copying of their 
mother versus the expert and showed a tentative indication of the Slide bias.  This would 
suggest a brief window at age seven where children copied the expert, before a preference for 
the Slide began to override this effect.  The second piece of evidence comes from the finding 
that the oldest children made fewer completions of their chosen action than the younger 
children.   Nine- to ten year-olds made an average of just one completion of the twice-
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demonstrated action – presumably indicating their understanding that two completions were 
not necessary to release the prize.   In contrast, the younger age groups made an average of 
two completions – suggesting their high reliance on social learning, without such causal 
reasoning.  This further suggests that the switch in the 7- to 8-year-olds was truly towards the 
expert, since they, like the 5- to 6-year-olds seemed to be taking a social, and not a causal, 
stance.  
Follow Up Study 
As outlined in the introduction, goal-orientated, causal action tasks may be 
particularly vulnerable to the rejection of social learning strategies (Hu et al., 2013).  Unlike 
the learning of language (in which most selective trust research has been conducted) and 
social conventions, it is possible to attempt to find a solution to causal tasks individually.  
Taken together, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the oldest children were 
taking a fundamentally different approach from the younger, whereby they placed less weight 
on social information and more on their own personal or causal understanding. Why, 
however, should these older children exhibit such a strong preference for the Slide method?   
To answer this question, a small follow up study was conducted (N = 30; 15 six- to 
seven year-olds and 15 nine- to ten-year-olds; see Electronic Supplementary Materials for full 
information) with the purpose of (a) replicating the Slide bias in older children and (b) 
questioning both younger and older children about the causal effectiveness of the Slide and 
the Trapdoor method. In this study, children were not given demonstrations from two models.  
Rather, the experimenter demonstrated each of the two possible methods (in a 
counterbalanced order) before questioning children about their causal efficacy.   
When asked which method they were going to choose, children in both age groups 
(younger group 12 out of 15, p < .04, Binomial; older group 13 out of 15, p < .001, Binomial) 
stated that they were going to select the Slide.  Furthermore, nearly all of these children were 
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able to provide an adequate causal explanation for how the Slide might work to release the 
egg (younger group 10 of 12; older group 13 of 13).  These explanations generally tended to 
involve an understanding that the Slide mechanism would push the egg along the length of 
the puzzle box and down into the red prize receptacle.  In contrast, only a small minority of 
older children (younger group 0 of 15; older group 3 of 15) were able to adequately explain 
how the Trapdoor might work – e.g., ‘It would work if it pulls out a platform, it might drop 
the egg down’.  Indeed, many children struggled to imagine how the ‘pulling’ mechanism of 
the Trapdoor could move the egg in the right direction, saying for example, ‘Will only pull it, 
it wouldn’t push it’; ‘You pull it, and if you pull it, it won’t end up over there’.  After 
questioning, when children were finally invited to attempt to retrieve the egg from the puzzle 
box, nearly all of them (younger group 14 of 15, p < .001, Binomial; older group 13 of 15, p 
< .001, Binomial) used the Slide. 
Thus, it would seem that children found the Slide method more causally plausible 
than the Trapdoor.  Surprisingly, this bias for the Slide method was just as strong in the 
younger children as in the older children.  This clarifies our interpretation of the findings of 
Experiment 2, suggesting not that children’s emerging Slide bias began to override their 
willingness to learn from a particular model, but rather that children, with age, began to 
prioritize a pre-existing preference for the Slide method, above social learning. 
In Experiment 2, it was found that, although younger children were, on average, 
faithful in reproducing two full completions of their chosen action, the oldest children 
reproduced only one.  This effect was lost in the follow-up study, wherein both age groups 
repeated the action less than twice: younger group mean 1.33; older group mean 0.93 
(standard deviations 0.91 and 0.53 respectively; no significant difference between age groups 
t(28) = 1.47, p = .15).  This may not be surprising, however, as children were asked to reflect 
upon how the two mechanisms may or may not work before performing their action.  That is, 
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they were explicitly encouraged to think causally.  This may have (a) led them to the 
understanding that two completions were not necessary to eject the prize or (b) led them to 
take a ‘causal stance’ whereby they demonstrated their understanding that two completions 
were not necessary to eject the prize.  Either way, this finding supports the contention that the 
younger children in Experiments 1 and 2 were taking a ‘social stance’, rather than a ‘causal 
stance’, as indexed by their faithful copying of either their mother or the expert. 
General Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that children aged 5- to 6-years, when attempting to learn how 
to release a prize from a novel puzzle box, preferred to copy their mother over both a stranger 
and an established expert.  This preference occurred despite children acknowledging the 
expert model’s superior capability, suggesting that children’s explicit understanding of who is 
best qualified does not necessarily drive their copying behavior.  Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that 7- to 8-year-olds switched away from copying their mother and towards copying the 
expert.  This age group’s strong social learning stance (as indexed by their faithful copying of 
two completed actions), as well as the finding that nearly all 7-year-olds copied the action 
that the expert demonstrated, is highly suggestive that this switch was driven by the increased 
weighting that children placed on expertise.  These results together broadly support the 
hypothesis of Henrich and Broesch (2011), who predicted that an initial preference for 
learning from familiar caregivers should, with development, give way to a preference for 
learning from strangers – favoring model biases for competence or expertise. 
 For children aged 9- to 10-years, our finding of a ‘Slide bias’ suggests that children 
of this age did not use a social learning strategy when deciding how to release the prize from 
the puzzle box.  Instead, they preferred to rely on their own causal understanding or naïve 
physics to reason that the Slide was a more plausible method than the Trapdoor.  This shift 
from a social, to a personal, learning strategy is further underlined by the finding that the 
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oldest children made fewer completions of their chosen method than the younger children – 
presumably indicating their causal understanding that extra completions were superfluous to 
the goal of the task. 
An alternative explanation for older children making fewer completions could be that 
they were simply less motivated by the puzzle-box (and the reward) than younger children 
and so interacted with the task less.  We cannot absolutely rule out this interpretation, but the 
finding that younger children in the follow-up study also performed fewer than two 
completions (after being explicitly encouraged to reason causally about the puzzle-box) does 
add support to the contention that making fewer completions is a valid indication of children 
taking a ‘causal stance’ to the task.           
An Adaptive Developmental Trajectory?  
It is tempting to interpret the shift revealed in the current study, from a social stance 
in younger children, to a causal stance in older children, in terms of  an adaptive 
developmental trajectory – see Figure 3.  Stages 1 and 2, in line with Henrich and Broesch 
(2011), may represent the predicted transition from an initial bias for learning from familiar 
caregivers towards learning from an expert.  Stage 3 might suggest a further phase, not 
predicted by Henrich and Broesch.  Here, once children perceive themselves to have an 
adequate causal understanding of a task, they rely on their own skill or knowledge, rather 
than deferring to others.  Such a strategy may be adaptive in that it prevents children from 
being led astray by social learning.  Rather than accepting all socially transmitted information 
at face value, children first check whether the information fits with their pre-existing 
knowledge (Harris, 2012, Chapter 2; Harris, 2002).  This may allow children to construct 
increasingly robust schemas and knowledge bases, rather than starting ‘from scratch’ with 
each isolated instance of social learning.  
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We must, however, be cautious about over-interpreting the current data.  A more 
parsimonious construal may be that children make use of three different heuristics – (1) copy 
mother, (2) copy expert, (3) use own causal knowledge – and that these may unfold at 
different ages (and even in a different order) according to the transparency of the causal 
mechanism in question, and according to contextual cues.  Consider, for example, a recent 
study which found that children aged 7-11 years were more likely, with age, to defer to expert 
testimony that contradicted their naïve physics (Symons, Tolmie & Oaksford, 2015). This 
would seem to be the reverse of current findings.  Symons et al.’s task required children to 
reason about the contributory effects of three different variables on a continuous 
measurement (how far a car would travel).  The current task, in contrast, is perhaps more 
binary, in that children are required to reason about whether a mechanical action is likely to 
move a reward in the right direction or not. Thus, it may be that as children mature they make 
more, not less, use of social learning heuristics, at least for tasks where the possible causal 
relations between the start and end state are more uncertain.  Furthermore, it may be possible 
to manipulate the experimental context so that even very young children (in line with findings 
on selective attention in infants, reviewed in the introduction) favor learning from an expert 
rather than from their mother. Relevant manipulations might be that the test item is presented 
as belonging to the expert or that the test location is clearly associated with the expert (e.g., a 
doctor’s surgery or mechanic’s workshop). Future research should thus be directed towards 
manipulating the complexity and transparency of causal tasks, as well as experimental 
contexts, in order to identify how these relate to the relative unfolding of the three learning 
heuristics identified in his experiment.   
Overconfidence in One’s Own Judgments? 
The discussion so far has assumed older children’s neglect of social learning to be an 
intelligent response, indicating their mastery of a task.  However, it should be borne in mind 
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that the older children in the current experiment were not correct in their assumption that the 
Slide method was the superior option for releasing the prize from the puzzle box.  The 
Trapdoor was an equally viable and functional solution, advocated (for fifty percent of the 
time) by an established expert. Many artifacts in human culture that children must make 
sense of are causally opaque.  Therefore, is it really sensible, or adaptive, to ignore an expert 
who demonstrates a perfectly valid method, in favor of an option that children view as more 
physically plausible?    
Overconfidence in one’s own judgments, as indexed by the rejection of advice from 
others, is an effect that has been robustly demonstrated in adults (Soll & Mannes, 2011; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).  Young children, in contrast, seem especially willing to update 
their own initial guesses on the basis of testimony from others (Rakoczy, Ehrling, Harris, & 
Schultze, 2015; Robinson & Whitcombe, 2003).  However a recent study finds that they 
become increasingly reluctant to do so with age (Morgan et al., 2015).  This phenomenon is 
of interest to theorists of cultural evolution because experimental studies with adults find that 
many participants make far less use of social information than mathematical models 
(describing the evolution of optimal social information use) would predict (Efferson et al., 
2007; Eriksson & Strimling, 2009; Mesoudi, 2011).  Erikson and Strimling offer several 
explanations for this counterintuitive bias – including (a) that individuals may gain more 
‘cognitive rewards’ from working out a solution for themselves, and (b) that humans may 
have a general tendency to generate personal solutions as part of a cooperative, ‘anti-
freeloading’ propensity for contributing to new knowledge.  Examining the emergence of a 
possible bias in children to favor their own, rather than others’ solutions, may help 
distinguish between these possible motivations and their implications for the effective 
transmission of culture. 
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Future Directions for Research on Selective Trust in Familiar Caregivers 
The current study contributes to a small portfolio of research on the topic of selective 
learning from familiar caregivers, with the finding that, with age, children’s preference for 
copying their mother shifts towards copying an expert – supporting the evolutionary 
predictions of Henrich and Broesch (2011).  In modern societies, however, children’s first 
introduction to an ‘expert’ is unlikely to be in the fashion that Henrich and Broesch envisage, 
whereby, for example, hunter-gatherer children hone their skill with a bow and arrow by 
seeking out the most successful hunters in the community.  Rather, the first ‘expert’ in 
modern (especially Western) children’s lives is almost always a school teacher.  Teachers 
exist in children’s lives, not as peripheral members of their community, but as familiar 
caregivers themselves (especially for preschoolers).  It will be important for future research to 
examine how children shift from learning from familiar caregivers, to unfamiliar experts, 
through the transitional stage of learning from caregivers who are teachers. 
Conclusion 
An abundance of studies over the past ten years has revealed potent effects of 
selectivity in children’s social learning.  Few selective learning experiments, however, have 
been conducted with: (a) goal orientated action tasks or (b) children above the age of seven 
years.  The current findings suggest that these may be fertile areas of research, enabling 
examination of the relative weighting that children place on their personal causal 
understanding versus their learning from others, how this changes over time, and whether 
such changes are adaptive in terms of cultural evolutionary theory.    
 
 
 
 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   32 
 
References 
 Chudek, M., Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2015). Cultural evolution. In D. M. Buss 
(Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology (749-769). New York: John Wiley & 
Sons.  
Burdett E. R. R., Lucas, A. J., Buchsbaum, D., McGuigan, N., Wood, L. A., & Whiten, A. 
  Copy the expert or the crowd?  Children's selective trust in learning instrumental and
  normative skills.  Presented at the Society for Research in Child Development 
  (SRCD), Philadelphia, USA, March, 2015. 
Cavalli-Sforza, L., Feldman, M., Chen, K., & Dornbusch, S. (1982). Theory and observation 
in cultural transmission. Science, 218(4567), 19–27. doi:10.1126/science.7123211 
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., & Feldman, M. W. (1981). Cultural transmission and evolution. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
Chudek, M., Heller, S., Birch, S., & Henrich, J. (2012). Prestige-biased cultural learning: 
bystander’s differential attention to potential models influences children's learning. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 33(1), 46–56.doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.05.005 
Corriveau, K. H., Harris, P. L., Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Arnott, B., Elliott, L., … de 
Rosnay, M. (2009). Young children’s trust in their mother's claims: longitudinal links 
with attachment security in infancy. Child Development, 80(3), 750–61. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01295.x 
Corriveau, K., & Harris, P. L. (2009). Choosing your informant: weighing familiarity and 
recent accuracy. Developmental Science, 12(3), 426–437.  
Efferson, C., Richerson, P. J., McElreath, R., Lubell, M., Edsten, E., Waring, T. M., … 
Baum, W. (2007). Learning, productivity, and noise: an experimental study of cultural 
transmission on the Bolivian Altiplano. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(1), 11–17. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.05.005 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   33 
 
Eriksson, K., & Strimling, P. (2009). Biases for acquiring information individually rather 
than socially. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 7(4), 309–329. 
doi:10.1556/JEP.7.2009.4.4 
Harris, P. L. (2002). Checking our sources : the origins of trust in testimony. Studies In 
History and Philosophy of Science, 33, 315–333. 
Harris, P. L. (2012). Trusting What You’re Told: How Children Learn From Others. 
Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press. 
Harris, P. L., & Corriveau, K. H. (2011). Young children’s selective trust in informants. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 366(1567), 1179–87. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0321 
Harris, P. L., & Lane, J. D. (2014). Infants understand how testimony works. Topoi, 33(2), 
443–458. doi:10.1007/s11245-013-9180-0 
Henrich, J., & Broesch, J. (2011). On the nature of cultural transmission networks: evidence 
from Fijian villages for adaptive learning biases. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 1139–48. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0323 
Hewlett, B. S., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1986). Cultural transmission among aka pygmies. 
American Anthropologist, 88(4), 922–934. doi:10.1525/aa.1986.88.4.02a00100 
Hewlett, B. S., Fouts, H. N., Boyette, A. H., & Hewlett, B. L. (2011). Social learning among 
Congo Basin hunter-gatherers. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 1168–78. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0373 
Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8(3), 
164–81. doi:10.1007/s10071-004-0239-6 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   34 
 
Hu, J. C., Buchsbaum, D., & Griffiths, T. L. When does the majority rule ? Preschoolers ’ 
trust in majority informants varies by domain. Proceedings of the 35th annual meeting of 
the Cognitive Science Society, Berlin, Germany, August, 2013. 
Kim, G., & Kwak, K. (2011). Uncertainty Matters : Impact of Stimulus Ambiguity on Infant 
Social Referencing. Infant and Child Development, 463, 449–463. doi:10.1002/icd 
Koenig, M. A., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2013). Selective social learning: New perspectives on 
learning from others. Developmental Psychology, 49(3), 399–403. 
doi:10.1037/a0031619 
Lyons, D. E., Damrosch, D. H., Lin, J. K., Macris, D. M., & Keil, F. C. (2011). The scope 
and limits of overimitation in the transmission of artefact culture. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 
1158–67. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0335 
McElreath, R., & Strimling, P. (2008). When natural selection favors imitation of parents. 
Current Anthropology, 49(2), 307–316. doi:10.1086/524364 
Mesoudi, A. (2009). How cultural evolutionary theory can inform social psychology and vice 
versa. Psychological Review, 116(4), 929–952. doi:10.1037/a0017062 
Mesoudi, A. (2011). An experimental comparison of human social learning strategies: 
payoff-biased social learning is adaptive but underused. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
32(5), 334–342. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.12.001 
Morgan, T. J. H., Laland, K. N., & Harris, P. L. (2015). The development of adaptive 
conformity in young children: effects of uncertainty and consensus. Developmental 
Science, 18(4), 511–24. doi:10.1111/desc.12231 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259. 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   35 
 
Rakoczy, H., Ehrling, C., Harris, P. L., & Schultze, T. (2015). Young children heed advice 
selectively. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 138, 71–87. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2015.04.007 
Robinson, E. J., & Whitcombe, E. L. (2003). Children’s suggestibility in relation to their 
understanding about sources of knowledge. Child Development, 74(1), 48–62. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8624.t01-1-00520 
Soll, J. B., & Mannes, A. E. (2011). Judgmental aggregation strategies depend on whether the 
self is involved. International Journal of Forecasting, 27(1), 81–102. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.05.003 
Stenberg, G. (2009). Selectivity in Infant Social Referencing. Infancy, 14(4). 
doi:10.1080/1525oooO902994115 
Symons, G., Tolmie, A., & Oaksford, M. Source Reliability in the Development of 
Children’s Understanding of Causal Systems.  Proceedings of the EuroAsianPacific 
Joint Conference on Cognitive Science, Torino, Italy, September, 2015. 
Walden, T., & Kim, G. (2005). Infants’ social looking toward mothers and strangers. 
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 29(5), 356–360.  
Whiten, A., Hinde, R. A., Laland, K. N., & Stringer, C. B. (2011). Culture Evolves. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 366(1567), 938–48. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0372 
Wood, L. A., Kendal, R. L., & Flynn, E. G. (2015). Does a peer model’s task proficiency 
influence children’s solution choice and innovation? Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 139, 190-202. 
Yaniv, I., & Kleinberger, E. (2000). Advice taking in decision making: egocentric 
discounting and reputation formation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 83(2), 260–281. doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2909 
CHILDREN’S SELECTIVE COPYING   36 
 
Table 1 
Video Clips used to Establish Expertise in the Mother vs. Expert Condition   
 Expert  
 
Inexpert  
Clip 
1 
Opening scene Closing Scene Opening Scene Closing Scene 
 
    
 The blue and red counters are rotated 
(using the center dial) from the top 
corners of the board to the bottom center 
track.  They are then pushed down the 
track and off the board to reveal two toy 
animals hidden under them. 
 
The blue counter is rotated (using the 
center dial) from the top left corner into 
the bottom left corner.  It is then rotated to 
the top right corner where it is pushed up 
against the red counter. 
Clip 
2 
    
 The yellow counter is placed on top of the 
peg on the yellow circle.  The top layer is 
then rotated to reveal a toy rabbit hidden 
in the second layer. 
The top layer is manipulated, but will not 
rotate because the yellow counter blocks 
it.  The yellow counter is then placed into 
the opposite hole (still blocking the top 
layer) followed by another unsuccessful 
attempt at rotation. 
 
Clip 
3 
    
 The middle and bottom blue shelves are 
pulled out in turn, allowing a toy cow to 
drop down from the center portion of the 
tower and out of the bottom doorway. 
The green pyramids are lifted and 
inspected, revealing no toy animals.  The 
lid of the tower is then lifted and the top 
portion of the tower inspected, again 
revealing no toy animals. 
 
 
These video clips are available to view in the Supplementary Electronic Material 
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Table 2 
Number of Children Providing Responses in each of Five Categories when Asked ‘Why’ they 
performed their Chosen Action (Experiments 1 & 2) 
 Model Causal Better Uninform Don’t Know Total 
Mother vs. Stranger       
5- to 6-years 6 10 1 3 4 24 
       
Mother vs. Expert       
5- to 6-years  5 6 2 5 5 23 
7- to 8-years 3 11 0 1 7 22 
9- to 10-years 3 15 0 2 2 22 
 
Note that the totals for each age group are slightly less than the sample sizes of 25, as they do 
not include children who attempted both demonstrated methods 
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Figure 1 
Practice Puzzle Box (a) and Test Puzzle Box (b) 
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Figure 2  
Percentage of Children Who Copied their Mother and Claimed their Mother was ‘Better’ 
 
  
*
p < .001; Children who attempted both demonstrated methods (N=3) are not included in the 
analysis. 
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Figure 3 
Percentage of Children Who Copied their Mother (rather than the Expert) and Used the Slide 
Action (rather than the Trapdoor).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For age-categories 1 and 2 children are at chance in their use of the Slide vs. the Trapdoor.  
They demonstrate a model bias towards their Mother (1) and then demonstrate a significant 
shift towards copying the Expert (2).  At age-category 3 100% of children use the Slide rather 
than the Trapdoor, neglecting model biases in favor of their own causal understanding or 
naïve physics. Children who attempted both demonstrated methods (N=8) are not included in 
the analysis.
*
p < .05, 
*
p < .001 
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Figure 4 
Mean Number of Times (with 95% Confidence Intervals) that Children completed their 
Chosen Action  
 
Children who attempted both demonstrated methods (N=8) are not included 
